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External financing is important when inventors and small technology-based firms commercialize their 
inventions. However, the private information of inventors about the quality of their products causes information 
asymmetries and moral hazard problems. To help compensate for potentially non-existing capital markets, the 
Swedish Government has intervened by offering loans with different terms to firms and inventors. This paper 
analyzes the association between various forms of external financing and performance in profit-terms when 
patents are commercialized. The empirical work is based on a patent survey sent to Swedish inventors and small 
firms, where the response rate is 80 %. The estimations show that projects with soft government financing in the 
R&D-phase have a significantly inferior performance compared to projects without such financing, whereas 
those receiving government loans on commercial terms perform as the average. Distinguishing between 
governmental financing alternatives with different terms makes it possible to draw the conclusion that 
government failure primarily depends on bad financing terms, rather than bad project selection. A policy 
implication is therefore that public loans should be granted on commercial terms already in the R&D-phase of 
projects.  
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Firms and inventors file patents for their inventions for different reasons. One reason is to 
eventually introduce the invention on the market, thereby turning it into an innovation. 
Patenting is then a method for securing the ownership of incomes and getting sufficient 
incentives to commercialize the invention. Owners may also file patents for strategic, 
defensive reasons. They might want to deter competitors from using the invention, intend to 
use shadow-patents, serving to protect other similar patents.  
Previous studies have attempted to estimate private market values of patent rights by: 
1) sending questionnaires directly to the owners (see, e.g. Griliches, 1990); 2) empirically 
estimating how the profit or the market value of the firm depends on patents and innovations 
(see, e.g. Griliches et al. 1987; Hall 1993); or 3) analyzing the renewal of patents (Pakes, 
1986; Schankerman and Pakes, 1986). Few previous studies have analyzed how different 
explanatory factors influence the value of patents or innovations. A further drawback when 
studying renewal fees is that the observer cannot know whether the patents are 
commercialized or serve other purposes. In the long run, a sufficient share of patents must be 
commercialized into useful products if they are to contribute to economic welfare.  
The purpose of the present study is to analyze how different strategies and background 
characteristics influence the performance of patent commercialization in profit-terms. The 
term commercialization here implies that the owners of the patent have introduced an 
innovation in an existing or in a new firm, licensed or sold the patent. Patents rather than 
inventions are chosen as the unit of observation, since the former are much easier to identify 
and track. In the empirical analysis, a unique database on Swedish patents granted to 
individual inventors and small firms is used. Information about individual patents has been 
collected. This includes data on if the patents were commercialized and if so whether the 
commercialization was successful or not. Using discrete statistical models, it is empirically 
examined how different explanatory factors (e.g., commercialization mode, financing, firm 
type, activity of inventors) affect the market performance. To the best of my knowledge, such 
an empirical analysis has never previously been attempted or carried out. 
  The specific purpose is to analyze how external financing influences the 
commercialization. In the previous empirical literature, external financing has empirically 
been shown to be important for patenting (e.g. Kortum and Lerner). However, such financing 
has not been empirically related to the performance of commercialization.  
Patents, like R&D projects, are characterized by high costs in the early R&D-phase as 
well as high uncertainty about future incomes. Lack of financial resources is one of the major    
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obstacles when innovations are to be introduced on the market, especially for small firms and 
individual inventors. Since inventors have more knowledge about the patent than potential 
external financiers, problems related to adverse selection and moral hazard are likely to be 
prevalent. The search and transaction costs for finding interesting projects and evaluating the 
technical and commercial potential are large for external financiers (Kaplan and Strömberg, 
2001).  
  Different nations have applied various strategies to compensate for imperfect capital 
markets and to bridge the gap between inventors and external financiers (Braunerhjelm, 1999, 
and Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann, 2004). In the United States, the government has 
facilitated private market solutions and the growth of private venture capital firms (Gompers 
and Lerner 2001). In Sweden, however, the government has instead intervened in the form of 
financial assistance and loans. Some of the public loans are market-oriented, whereas other 
loans have soft terms, e.g., the borrower can avoid repayment of the loan if the project fails. 
Such terms are likely to create further moral hazard problems. Another interesting question is 
whether the government is competent to find and evaluate appropriate projects to grant funds, 
since public employees have no profit incentives. These factors may lead to a negative 
selection of projects. By distinguishing between governmental financing with soft and 
market-oriented terms, hypotheses are set up and tested of whether a possible government 
failure depends on bad financing terms or a bad choice of projects in general. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Previous studies about commercialization of 
patents and adequate theories are discussed in section 2. The database and basic statistics are 
described in section 3. The statistical model and hypotheses are set up in section 4. The 
empirical estimations are shown in section 5, and the final section concludes. 
 
2. Previous studies and theories 
 
2.1 Previous studies 
Earlier patent studies have mostly used data from one or several national patent offices. This 
means that the researchers do not know whether the patents have been commercialized, or 
whether the commercialization was successful. Patent databases with detailed information 
(which are not available from the national patent offices) have seldom been collected. The 
few previous studies with such databases have focused on estimating the profits from 
patenting, or the market value of patents, rather than analyzing how different strategies are 
related to the outcome of the commercialization (Rossman and Sanders, 1957; Sanders et al.,    
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1958; Sanders, 1962, 1964; Schmookler, 1966; Cutler, 1984; SRI International, 1985). The 
main conclusions of these studies are that the mean value of patents is positive, but the 
median value is zero or negative, indicating a very large dispersion in economic value.  
Morgan  et al. (2001) describe the rate of commercialization of American patents 
across different groups. Industrial patents had a commercialization rate of 48.9%, whereas the 
rate in the education sector was 33.5%. However, the authors never try to relate this 
commercialization rate to other explanatory factors and do not estimate any survival model – 
perhaps due to data constrains. Using a survival model, Svensson (2004) estimates how 
different factors affect the commercialization decision. It was concluded that firms 
commercialize faster, and to a greater extent, than individual inventors, but also that the more 
government financing the inventors received during the R&D-phase, the longer it took until 
commercialization was initiated. Patents financed by the government were also more likely 
never to be commercialized. The explanation for this behavior could be found in either the 
loan terms, where the inventors could avoid repayment if the patent was never 
commercialized, or in a negative selection of projects. 
 
2.2 Performance of the commercialization compared to renewal of patents 
Another strand of the patent literature has analyzed the renewal of patents (see e.g. Griliches, 
1990). The owners must pay a renewal fee to keep their patents in force – in many countries 
every year. Griliches argues that owners will only renew their patents if it is economically 
profitable. The percentage of renewed patents indicates how many patents have a positive 
economic value after a given number of years. Schankerman and Pakes (1986) show that 
about half the European patents are still renewed after 10 years, but only 10 percent are 
renewed in the whole statutory period (20 years). The models in Pakes (1986) and 
Schankerman and Pakes (1986) are based on the assumption that more valuable patents are 
renewed for longer periods than less valuable patents. The authors estimate both the 
distribution of the patent values and their rate of depreciation. The main conclusions of these 
studies are that most patents have a low value and that it depreciates fast, and only a few have 
a significant high value. In other words, the value distribution of patents is severely skewed to 
the right. 
There are some problems with the renewal measurement. First, the renewal fee is a 
relatively modest annual cost; so that even those patents that were renewed for the whole 
statutory period may have a low absolute value. Second, there is an identification problem, 
where the value of the patent above a certain threshold value cannot be estimated based on    
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renewal alone. Finally, patents that are not renewed need not necessarily have a low value, as 
the product based on the patent might be commercialized with a short lifetime. In this 
lifetime, the product could either have been profitable for the owner or not. 
Although most commercialized patents can be expected to be renewed and most non-
commercialized patents to be killed, there are many exceptions, as will be shown in section 3. 
Measuring the outcome of the commercialization does not take into account that also non-
commercialized patents might be profitable for the owner. Some patents are never 
commercialized, although they are renewed during the whole statutory period for strategic 
reasons. They serve, for example, as shadow patents and protect similar patents. Renewal 
studies take this phenomenon into account. However, the strategy to apply for defensive 
patents is primarily used by large firms (Svensson, 2002). Shadow-patents are relatively rare 
among individual inventors and small firms in our database (more about this in section 3). As 
previously noted; Irrespective of how the success, or the value, of patents has been measured, 
these studies have seldom related this measure to explanatory factors. An exception is 
Maurseth (2005), where patent citations across and within technology fields turn out to have 
different implications for the renewal of patents. 
 
2.3 Patents and external financing 
Inventions, like R&D-projects, are typically characterized by high costs and no incomes in the 
early R&D-phase, and high uncertainty about future incomes. Besides technological 
problems, lack of financial resources is one of the largest problems when the inventions are to 
be commercialized, i.e., innovations are created by the inventions and introduced into the 
market. Clearly, inventors have more knowledge about the invention than external financiers, 
licensees and buyers, leading to asymmetrical information and adverse selection problems. 
The search and transaction costs of finding interesting projects and evaluating the technical 
and commercial potential are, in other words, large for external actors. Therefore, market 
imperfections are likely to exist on the market for financing of innovation projects. To 
overcome market failures and the gap between inventors and external financiers, different 
countries have applied different strategies (Braunerhjelm, 1999, and Bottazzi, Da Rin, and 
Hellmann, 2004). In the United States, the government has facilitated private market solutions 
and the growth of private venture capital firms (Gompers and Lerner 2001). In Sweden, the 
government has intervened by offering financial assistance and loans to inventors and small 
technology-based firms.    
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  In the early R&D-phase – before manufacturing has started – the Swedish 
Government offers financial assistance and loans with soft loan terms to inventors and small 
technology-based firms. Considering the soft loans, the borrower pays a subsidized interest 
rate and begins to pay back the loan some years after the commercialization has started. 
However, if there is no commercialization or if the commercialization fails, the borrower 
needs not pay back the loan at all. If the borrower does receive incomes during the 
commercialization, the repayment of the loan is connected to product turnover. 
The soft loans offered by the Swedish government authorities are described in detail in 
Appendix. To give soft loans to a firm or an inventor in the R&D-phase, the government 
authorities had two selection criteria: 1) the project should have a good chance of success 
both technically and commercially; and 2) the project is a high-tech project. The government 
financing could cover up to 50-70 % of the total R&D-costs depending on which government 
authority provided the loan. Thus, there was a requirement of co-financing by the borrower or 
somebody else, but this financing was allowed to take the form of unpaid labor incomes. This 
is a cost which cannot be controlled by the government authority (moral hazard problems). 
Practically, the government loans could therefore cover more than 80 % of the project’s total 
R&D-costs. 
The design of the loan where repayment is connected to turnover rather than the profit 
means that projects with a low or medium expected profit level would probably not be 
commercialized at all, since the repayment of the loan would then erase the whole profit. 
However, this will not prevent commercialization if the expected profit level is high. Due to 
the design of the loans from government institutions, problems related to moral hazard are 
likely to emerge. Inventors, who have received soft loans from the government, need not care 
about further commercialization of the patent, since they know that there is a high probability 
of their not having to pay back the loans at all. The main conclusion in Svensson (2004) was 
that soft financing from the government in the R&D-phase reduces the probability of 
commercialization. In the present study, it is also hypothesized that the repayment terms of 
soft financing should give the owners less incentive to make an effort during 
commercialization. 
The government also offers entrepreneurs more market-oriented loans during the 
commercialization phase. These loans must be repaid, and have interest rates similar to those 
charged by commercial banks. The terms of such loans thereby do not detrimentally affect the 
borrowers’ incentives to perform well when innovations are introduced into the market.     
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The government-financing institutions are not profit maximizing, and tend to have 
fewer incentives to search for and select good patent projects to which they lend money. The 
employees do not invest their own private money. On the other hand, private venture capital 
firms and especially business angels are likely to be more careful than government institutions 
about which patent projects in which they invest. In addition, they tend to have a more active, 
and advisory, role already in the early phases of business projects. It is not unlikely that there 
is some form of negative selection, where the government tends to lend money to worse 
projects. 
  Based on the terms of government financing and the performance of the 
commercialization, two mutually exclusive hypotheses are set up: 
 
Hypothesis A: If projects with soft government financing fail during commercialization, but 
projects with market-oriented government financing do not, then the failure should depend on 
bad government loan terms. 
 
Hypothesis B: If projects with government financing – irrespective of the terms – fail during 
commercialization, then the failure is caused by the government choosing bad projects. 
  
  A common opinion is that the government selects among projects which have been 
turned down by private investors. Therefore, loans from government would go to relatively 
less profitable projects. However, Kaivanto and Stoneman (2006) have shown that soft 
government loans, as described above, are more attractive for inventors, and have a higher 
pecking order, than equity financing from private venture capitalists.
1 The authors give three 
reasons why such soft loans are attractive for firms and inventors. First, the patent owners do 
not lose control of the project. Secondly, the repayment is a variable cost, not a fixed cost, and 
do not increase the financial risk of the firm. Thirdly, debt usually requires collateral 
financing. However, the soft government loans are backed by future incomes and, therefore, 






                                                 
1 The authors call this kind of government financing for “sales contingent claims” (SCC), but it is almost 
identical to the soft loans provided by the Swedish government.    
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3. Database and descriptive statistics  
When analyzing the commercialization of patents, it is necessary to have a detailed database 
about individual patents.
2 In a previous pilot study (Svensson, 2002), the commercialization 
started within five years after the application year for most patents. According to Pakes 
(1986), most of the uncertainty of the value of the patent is resolved during the first three-four 
years after the patent application. Therefore, patents granted in 1998 were chosen for the 
current database.
3 In 1998, 2760 patents were granted in Sweden. 776 of these were granted to 
foreign firms, 902 to large Swedish firms with more than 1000 employees, and 1082 to 
Swedish individual inventors and firms with less than 1000 employees. Information about 
inventors, applying firms and their addresses for each patent was bought from the Swedish 
Patent and Registration Office (PRV). Thereafter, a questionnaire was sent out to the 
inventors.
4 In the pilot survey carried out in 2002, it turned out that large Swedish firms 
refused to provide information on individual patents. Furthermore, it is impossible to persuade 
foreign firms to fill in questionnaires about patents. These firms are almost always large 
multinationals firms. Therefore, the population consists of 1082 patents granted to Swedish 
individual inventors and firms with less than 1000 employees. This sample selection is not a 
problem, as long as the conclusions are drawn for small firms and individuals. 
In the questionnaire, we asked the inventors about the work place where the invention 
was created, the financing of the invention during the R&D phase, whether the patent was 
commercialized, which kind of commercialization mode was chosen, how the 
commercialization was financed, as well as the outcome of the commercialization. As many 
as 867 of the inventors filled in and returned the questionnaire, i.e., the response rate was 80% 
(867 out of 1082). This response rate is satisfactorily high, if taking into account that such a 
database has seldom been collected before and that inventors or applying firms usually 
consider information about inventions and patents to be secret. The fall-off primarily depends 
                                                 
2 All inventions do not result in patents. However, since an invention, which does not result in a patent, is not 
registered anywhere, there are two problems in empirically analyzing the invention rather than the patent. First, it 
is impossible to find these new ideas, products and developments among all firms and individuals. On the other 
hand, all patents are registered. Second, even if the “inventions” are found, it is difficult to judge whether they 
are sufficient improvements to be called inventions. Only the national and international patent offices make such 
judgements. Therefore, the choice of the patent rather than the invention is the only alternative for an empirical 
study of the commercialization process. 
3 The year the patent is granted is used here, but patents filed in a specific year might have been preferable. The 
choice of patents granted in a specific year is, however, not a problem in the statistical estimations. 
4 Each patent always has at least one inventor and often also an applying firm. The inventors or the applying firm 
can be the owner of the patent, but the inventors can also indirectly be owners of the patent, via the applying 
firm. Sometimes the inventors are only employed in the applying firm, which owns the patent. If the patent had 
more than one inventor, the questionnaire was sent to one inventor only.    
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on the addresses from PRV being out of date, and to a smaller degree on inventors refusing to 
reply. 
The application year of the 867 patents is described as light-gray staples in Figure 1. 
85% of the patents were applied for between 1994 and 1997. In 2003, commercialization had 
been started for 530 of these patents. The starting year of the commercialization is represented 
by dark staples, which almost follow a normal distribution. Although the last year of 
observation is 2003, it is not likely that many of the 337 non-commercialized patents will be 
commercialized after 2003. 
 
******** [Figure 1] ******** 
 
 The  commercialization  rate of the 867 patents is described across firm groups and 
ownership in Table 1. As many as 408 patents (47%) were granted to individual inventors,
5 
and 116, 201, 142 patents were granted to medium-sized firms (101-1000 employees), small 
firms (11-100 employees) and close companies (2-10 employees), respectively. The 
commercialization rate of the firm groups is between 66 and 74%, whereas the rate of the 
individuals is not higher than 52%. A contingent-table test suggests there to be a significant 
difference in the commercialization rate between firms and individuals. The chi-square value 
is 30.55 (with 3 d.f.), significant at the one-percent level. 
 
******** [Table 1] ******** 
 
  At the end point of observation (year 2003), the inventors answered to estimate 
whether the outcome of the commercialization would likely become a profit, a break-even or 
a loss outcome. If they did not know, the reply was registered as an uncertain outcome.
6 In 
Table 2, discrete values of the outcome in profit terms are described across firm groups. It 
would have been desirable to measure the outcome in money terms. However, such 
information was impossible to collect, a conclusion drawn already when undertaking the pilot 
study (Svensson, 2002).
7 Since the patents were granted in 1998 and some of them were 
commercialized even later, the outcome is uncertain for around 12% of the commercialized 
                                                 
5 The group of individual inventors includes private persons, self-employed inventors as well as two-three 
inventors, who are organized in trading companies or private firms without employees. 
6 For a vast majority of the patents, the commercialization had reached such a stage that there was no uncertainty 
at all about the outcome. 
7 It is very complicated to estimate profit flows, because most firms have many products in their statement of 
account, and many individuals do not have any statement of account at all.    
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patents. Many of these uncertain patents would probably later (after 2003) be categorized in 
the break-even or loss groups. As described in the table, the outcome is quite different across 
firm groups, where the group of individual inventors has the worst outcome, but there may be 
other underlying factors explaining this difference, e.g., the commercialization mode or the 
fact that the new product replaced an earlier one. 
 
******** [Table 2] ******** 
 
In Table 3, outcomes are described across external financing. It is obvious that 
projects with private venture capital perform better than those with government financing. 
However, only projects with private venture capital in the R&D-phase can match the average 
in Table 2. On the other hand, external financing is primarily provided to close companies and 
individuals, which in general have a worse performance than small and medium-sized firms. 
 
******** [Table 3] ******** 
 
In Table 4, commercialized patents are compared to renewed patents. Owners must 
pay an annual renewal fee to the national patent office to keep their patents in force. If the 
renewal fee is not paid in one single year, the patent expires. As expected, renewed patents 
(71%) have been commercialized to a higher degree than expired ones (49%). The chi-square 
value below the table shows there to be a strong correlation between commercialized and 
renewed patents. However, 36% of the commercialized patents are already expired. This is 
either due to the products having a short lifecycle or the commercialization having failed. 
41% of the non-commercialized patents are still alive. Many of these patents might be 
defensive patents, with the purpose of deterring competitors from using the invention or 
defending other patents. In the latter case, the patents serve as shadow-patents.  
 
******** [Table 4] ******** 
 
One objection against the measurement of success in this study would be that the 
patent might be profitable for the owners, even if it is never commercialized, e.g., if it serves 
as a shadow-patent. If this is the case, the owner should have more similarly granted patents. 
Among the commercialized patents in the database, 46% of the owners have at least one more 
similar patent. Among the non-commercialized patents, this percentage is only 33%. If the    
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patent had not been commercialized, the inventor was also asked: why this was the case. 
Among the 337 non-commercialized patents, only 15 inventors answered as one of the 
potential reasons for its not having been commercialized that the patent served as a shadow-
patent.
8 Thus, it can be concluded that keeping patents for defending other patents is not 
common among individuals and small firms, at least based on survey responses. This strategy 
is more frequent among large multinational firms (Svensson, 2002). 
In Table 5, the outcome of commercialization is shown for both expired and renewed 
patents. The general pattern is that patents that are still alive have a higher share of successful 
outcomes as compared to expired patents, but the probability of a successful outcome also 
increases the longer was the life of the expired patent. There are however many exceptions. 
For example, some patents, which expired after only 1-5 years, were profitable, while many 
patents still renewed and commercialized have been losses for the owners. Therefore, the 
assumption that more valuable patents are renewed for longer periods is somewhat shaky in 
the renewal studies, which were discussed in section 2.2. 
 
******** [Table 5] ******** 
 
4. Econometric models and hypotheses 
4.1 Econometric model 
The dependent variable, PROFIT, in the empirical estimations measures the performance in 
profit terms of the commercialization for the original owner of the patent. It can take on four 
different discrete values denoted by index k: 
•  Profit, k=2; 
•  Break-even, k=1; 
•  Loss, k=0. 
 
Since it is possible to order the three alternatives, an ordered probit model is applied.
9. A 
multinomial logit model fails to take the ranking of the outcomes into account. On the other 
                                                 
8 The most frequent reasons here were: 1) problems with financing (115 patents); 2) problems with marketing 
(75 patents); 3) problems in finding a manufacturing firm/licensor (74 patents); and 4) the product is not yet 
ready for commercialization (62 patents). Note that inventors may have mentioned more than one reason why the 
patent was not commercialized. 
9 There were 86 observations in the database, where the owner could not specify the expected profit level of the 
commercialization. These missing values could also be treated as a fourth, uncertain, outcome of PROFIT. A 
multinomial logit model, where all four alternatives were included, was estimated. Then we accomplished a test 
for independence of irrelevant alternatives (Hausmann and McFadden, 1984). When excluding the uncertain 
alternative in the multinomial logit model, this test cannot be rejected. Thus, the parameter estimates between the    
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hand, an ordinary regression would treat the differences between 0 and 1 the same as that 
between 1 and 2. This would be an error, since the discrete outcomes are only ranked. The 
ordered probit model can be described in the following way: 
 
where Xi is a vector of patent specific characteristics. The vector of coefficients, α, shows the 
influence of the independent variables on the profit level. The residual vector εi represents the 
combined effects of unobserved random variables and random disturbances. The residuals are 
assumed to have a normal distribution and the mean and variance are normalized to 0 and 1. 
The vector with the latent variable, yi
*, is unobserved. The model is based on the cumulative 
normal distribution function, F(Xα), and is estimated via maximum likelihood procedures. 
The difference with the two-response probit model is here that a parameter (threshold value), 
ω, is estimated by α. The probabilities Pi(k) = Pi(y=k) for the three outcomes are: 
 
The threshold value, ω, must be larger than 0, for all probabilities to be positive. 
  An objection against the sample and the chosen statistical model would be that the 
patents, which are commercialized, are not a random sample of patents, but have specific 
characteristics that led to them being commercialized in the first place. This could result in 
misleading parameter estimates. An appropriate statistical model is therefore an ordered 
probit model with sample selectivity (Greene, 2002). In the first step, a probit model estimates 
how different factors influence the decision to commercialize the patent: 
                                                                                                                                                          
other outcome alternatives are almost unaffected if the uncertain alternative is excluded. It is then no problem to 
exclude those patents with unknown profit-levels from the estimations. 
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where  di* is a latent index and di is the selection variable, indicating if the patent is 
commercialized or not. Zi is a vector of explanatory variables which influence the probability 
that the patent is commercialized and θ is a vector of parameters to be estimated. ui is a vector 
of  normally distributed residuals with zero mean and a variance equal to 1. 
From the probit estimates, the selection variable di is then used to estimate a full 
information maximum likelihood model of the ordered probit model (Greene, 2002).
10 At the 
same time, the first step probit model is re-estimated. The residuals, [ε, u] are assumed to 
have a bivariate standard normal distribution and correlation ρ. There is selectivity if ρ is not 
equal to zero. 
 
4.2 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses show how an increase of the explanatory variable influences the probability 
that the owners will make a profit or a loss.  All hypotheses and basic statistics about the 
explanatory variables are shown in Table 6.  
 
******** [Table 6] ******** 
 
Below, five variables follow measuring the involvement of external financing during 
the R&D- and commercialization phases. 
As discussed in section 2.3, the Swedish government institutes, which assist with 
financing of patent projects in the R&D-phase, have curious loan terms. The borrower can 
avoid paying back the loan if the patent is not commercialized, or if the commercialization 
fails. If the patent is commercialized, repayment is connected to the turnover, as opposed to 
profit. This means that the expected return of commercialization must be higher than a 
threshold value – otherwise the repayment might erase the entire profit. Such financing during 
the R&D phase will therefore deter inventors from commercialization, which was also 
statistically confirmed in Svensson (2004). GOVRD takes on the value of 1 if the project had 
soft government financing in the R&D-phase, and 0 otherwise. I expect only patents with an 
expected profit above the threshold value to be commercialized. However, the soft financing 
                                                 
10 This is not a two-step Heckman model. No Lambda is computed and used in the second step.  
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terms may induce fewer incentives to work hard on the commercialization. Therefore, the 
expected impact of GOVRD on the profit level is negative. 
In a similar way, the dummy PRIVRD is a dummy that equals 1 if the project was 
financed through external private venture capital in the R&D-phase. Private venture 
capitalists can be regarded as strictly profit maximizing and they only invest in, and 
commercialize, projects when they expect a profit. It is also likely that patents, which had 
external private financing during the R&D phase, more easily attract external venture capital 
(from the same private venture capitalists) during the commercialization phase. However, it is 
not obvious that patents, which receive external private financing, should become more 
successful as compared to those that do not receive financing.  
There is also a third kind of external R&D-financing. OTHRD equals 1 if the project 
was financed through universities and research foundations, and 0 otherwise. Typically, 
patents created at universities have this kind of external financing. The intention of this kind 
of financing is not to assist a patent project, but rather to finance R&D in general. However, 
the financiers seldom have any control over for what the resources are actually used. It is 
difficult for the inventors to use the resources for patent applications, but easier to hide labor 
costs necessary for creating the invention within this financing. A problem with such 
financing is that it cannot be used for commercialization. Consequently, the inventors often 
stand alone without any external funds when considering commercialization. A negative 
parameter estimate is therefore expected on the profit level. 
  Two dummies showing involvement of external financing during the 
commercialization are included. GOVCOM takes on the value of 1 if the commercialization 
was supported by government loans, and 0 otherwise. In a similar way, PRIVCOM equals 1 if 
the commercialization was partly financed by private venture capitalists. Government 
financing during the commercialization is much more market-oriented in Sweden as 
compared to government financing during the R&D-phase. GOVCOM might have some 
impact on the profit outcome, but it is difficult to specify how; for example, there might be 
some form of negative selection of projects, since government institutions have no profit 
incentives. The impact on the profit level is unsettled. 
It is expected that firms, which have marketing, manufacturing and financial resources 
in-house, have better possibilities of becoming successful in their commercialization as 
compared to individuals. FIRM1 is a dummy that takes on the value of 1 for medium-sized 
firms with 101-1000 employees and 0 otherwise. FIRM2 equals 1 for small firms with 11-100 
employees and 0 otherwise. Finally, FIRM3 is a third dummy taking the value of 1 for close    
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companies with 2-10 employees, and 0 otherwise. All parameter estimates are expected to 
have positive effects on the profit level, since the firm dummies are here related to the 
reference group of individual inventors. Furthermore, the larger is the firm, the better are the 
possibilities of becoming successful. Thus, the parameter estimate of FIRM1 is expected to be 
larger that that of FIRM2 which, in turn, is expected to be larger than FIRM3.  
There are four main modes of commercialization: 1) selling the patent; 2) licensing the 
patent; 3) commercialization in an existing firm; or 4) in a new firm. SELL is a dummy 
variable, which takes on the value of 1 if the patent was sold, and 0 otherwise. LICENS equals 
1 if the patent was licensed and 0 otherwise. If the patent was commercialized in a new firm, 
NEW equals 1 and 0 otherwise. The reference group here is patents commercialized in the 
owners’ existing firms. New firms have considerably more problems to overcome as 
compared to existing ones. New firms should therefore have a lower profit level. There are no 
obvious hypotheses on how SELL and LICENS should influence the profit level. These 
hypotheses are therefore unsettled. 
COMYEAR measures the year when the commercialization started. The later is the 
starting year, the fewer are the years until the end of the observation (2003). Thus, the 
probability of an uncertain outcome should then increase. If patent owners wait to 
commercialize their patent, this might depend on uncertainty about future incomes. 
WAITYEAR measures the number of years between the application year and the starting year 
of the commercialization. COMYEAR and WAITYEAR might be correlated, but need not be, 
since the patents have different application years. Neither COMYEAR nor WAITYEAR have 
any expected impact on the profit level. 
According to previous studies, it is important that the inventors, who have specific 
knowledge about the patent, are active during the commercialization. ACTIVE is a dummy, 
which equals 1 if the inventors had an active role during the commercialization, and 0 
otherwise. It is expected to have a positive influence on the profit level. REPLACE is a 
dummy that equals 1 if the product based on the patent replaces a previous product of the 
patent owner, and 0 otherwise. If the new product replaces an earlier product, the 
commercialization is expected to be facilitated. The owner then already has customers, 
distribution channels, marketing, etc. A positive impact on the profit level is expected.  
MOREPAT is an additive dummy, which equals 1 if the inventors or the applying firm 
have more competitive Swedish patents in the same technology area, and 0 otherwise. 
Applying for many similar patents is a strategy often chosen by owners – especially large 
firms – that want to protect a main patent. These additional patents are called shadow patents    
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and are seldom commercialized. Given that a patent is commercialized, many similar patents 
imply a strong position and defense in the market and should increase the probability of 
success. Many similar patents can also be an indication that the owners have more knowledge 
and experience of the area. Thus, a positive impact on PROFIT is expected.  
A further variable measuring the complexity of the product is included. PARTSYST 
equals 1 if the patent is a part of a larger system/product, and 0 otherwise. The dummy 
variable KOMPL takes on the value of 1 if complementing patents are needed to create a 
product, and 0 otherwise. INVNMBR measures the number of inventors of the patent. The 
expected impacts on the dependent variable are unsettled. 
Some specific characteristics of the inventors are also included in the mode. SX 
measures the share of inventors, who are females. No specific influence on PROFIT is 
expected. ETH measures the share of inventors who belongs to ethnical minorities, i.e. an 
ethnical background other than West European or North American. It is expected that ethnical 
minorities have more problems with the commercialization. Thus a negative impact on 
PROFIT is expected. 
Different technologies are likely to be connected with different payoffs and risks. 
Consequently, the technology class can affect the profit level, given that the patent is 
commercialized. Patents are divided into 30 technology groups according to Breschi et al. 
(2004). These groups are based on the patents’ main IPC-Class. However, all technology 
groups are not represented in the dataset and some groups do not have enough observations.
11 
Therefore, only 16 groups and 15 additive dummies are used in the present study. 
The data is also divided into six different kinds of regions according to NUTEK 
(1998): Large-city regions, university regions, regions with important primary city centers, 
regions with secondary city centers, small regions with private employment, and small 
regions with government employment. Five additive dummies are included for these six 
groups in the estimations. 
  Something should also be said about the explanatory variables, which are expected to 
affect the commercialization decision (d) and are included in the probit equation when taking 
the selection problem into account. These variables are based on the model in Svensson 
(2004), where the commercialization decision was analyzed using survivals models. FIRM1, 
FIRM2, FIRM3, GOVRD, PRIVRD, OTHRD, MOREPAT, INVNMBR and KOMPL the region 
and technology dummies, as described above, are included in the probit equation. 
                                                 
11 A technology class must have at least one observation in each of the four outcome alternatives, in order to 
obtain an own technology dummy. Technology classes without enough observations are instead merged with 
other closely related classes (Breschi et al., 2004).    
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Furthermore, time dummies for the application year, and another variable (OWNER) is 
added.
12 On the other hand, variables characterizing the commercialization, e.g. 
commercialization mode (SELL, LICENS and NEWFIRM), ACTIVE, REPLACE, etc., cannot 
be included. This means that different explanatory variables are included in the probit and 
ordered probit equations. 
 
5. Empirical estimations  
To test for robustness, at least three variants of all models are estimated. In these variants, 
region dummies (A), technology dummies (B) and both region and technology dummies (C) 
are included. Furthermore, the model is estimated both without and with selectivity. In the 
latter case, the previous inclusion of dummy variables (A-C) is then repeated (D-F). An 
attempt to include additive dummies for unique owners (firms/inventors) in the estimations 
was also done, but this did not work out well due to multicollinearity problems.
13 
The results of the ordered probit model are shown in Table 7. Focusing on the 
financial variables, soft government financing in the R&D-phase, GOVRD, has a negative 
influence on the profit level, which is significant at the one-percent level. On the other hand, 
government financing in the commercialization phase – represented by GOVCOM – never has 
any significant impact on the profit level. These results also hold when we take account of 
sample selectivity (Models D-F). The later government financing is much more market-
oriented than the earlier soft R&D-financing. Thus, it seems that it is the terms of the 
financing that lead to the bad performance of government financed projects rather than the 
government choosing to lend money to bad projects. In other words, Hypothesis A dominates 
Hypothesis B (see section 2.3). 
One objection against the results is that the government selects among projects, which 
have been turned down by private investors. It would then be likely that government loans 
will go to less profitable projects. However, Kaivanto and Stoneman (2006) have shown that 
the pecking order is higher for soft government loans than for equity financing from venture 
capitalists, as discussed in section 2.3. Another objection is that it would be natural that 
projects with financing given in an early uncertain phase have a worse performance than 
                                                 
12 OWNER measures how large a share (in percent) of the patent that is directly or indirectly owned by the 
inventors.  
13 Among the 530 commercialized patents in the sample, there are 460 unique owners (firms/inventors). 418 
owners have only one commercialized patent in 1998, 29 owners have two patents, and only 13 owners have at 
least three patents. Dummies can only be assigned to those 42 owners with at least 2 patents. However, when 
including dummies for unique owners, the models were characterized by severe multicollinearity problems with 
extremely high standard errors for the owner dummies. These problems occurred even when all technology and 
region dummies were excluded and when dummies were included only for those 13 owners with at least three 
commercialized patents.    
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projects with financing given in a later, less uncertain phase. In order to solve this problem, 
sample selection is included in the last three models (D-F). This means that the model takes 
account of when the financing occurred.
14 Furthermore, the results of the private financing do 
not show that early financing (PRIVRD) has a worse performance than late financing 
(PRIVCOM). External private venture capital, regardless of when it was invested, does not 
have any influence on the profit level. 
Turning to the other variables, all firm group dummies have positive and strongly 
significant impacts on the profit level, implying that patents commercialized by firms have a 
higher probability of success as compared to patents commercialized by individual inventors. 
Furthermore, the parameter of FIRM1 is always significantly different from the parameter of 
FIRM3. FIRM2 is significantly different from FIRM3 at the five-percent level in two out of 
six runs. Considering the commercialization mode, licensing or selling the patent has a 
positive impact on the profit level compared to commercializing in an existing firm – the 
parameters are always significant at the five-percent level. The parameter of NEW is negative, 
but never significant. By recalculating the parameter estimates, however, it is easily seen that 
selling or licensing the patent has a positive influence on the profit level as compared to the 
new firm alternative – the differences are always significant at the one-percent level. The 
dummy variables, ACTIVE and MOREPAT, have positive and significant influences on 
PROFIT. Thus, an active role of the inventors during the commercialization and whether the 
owner has more similar patents are strategies or facts that give a higher probability for a 
successful commercialization. 
 
******** [Table 7 ******** 
 
An alternative interpretation of the bad performance of projects with government 
R&D-financing is that the government might assist patent projects with an average higher risk 
level. R&D-financing is mostly provided to projects owned by individuals, which should be 
expected to have a higher risk. Therefore, the effect of GOVRD is separately estimated for 
firms and individuals, by using an interaction dummy in Table 8. GOVRD has a significant 
influence on the profit level for both firms and individuals. The parameter estimate is more 
negative for firms, but the difference is never significant. 
 
******** [Table 8 ******** 
                                                 
14 Only those projects with government R&D financing, which have been commercialized, are compared with in 




Size interpretations of the estimated parameters are also necessary. The marginal 
effects of the significant explanatory variables on the probability of the profit level are shown 
in Table 9. To simplify, these effects are calculated around the means of the xi:s (Greene, 
1997).
15  If GOVRD changes from 0 to 1 in Model F, the probability of a successful outcome, 
P(2), decreases by 18 percentage units, the probability of a break-even outcome, P(1), 
increases by 4 percentage units and the probability of an unsuccessful one, P(0), increases by 
22 percentage units. The effect is larger for firms than for individuals, though the difference 
between these two groups is not significant. Similar interpretations of the marginal effects can 
be made for the other dummy variables in Table 9. For example, the probability of a success 
increases by 20 percentage units if the patent is sold as compared to commercializing in an 
existing firm. 
 
******** [Table 9] ******** 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This study has empirically estimated the importance of various background factors for a 
successful commercialization of patents, something never previously done. A unique database 
on Swedish patents owned by individual inventors and small firms was used. The database is 
based on a patent survey, where the response rate is as high as 80 %. The data made it 
possible to observe whether commercialization led to a successful, a break-even or an 
unsuccessful outcome in profit terms. 
By using discrete statistical models, it is concluded that projects with soft government 
financing in the R&D-phase have a significantly worse performance than projects without 
such financing. The marginal effect on the probabilities is not small. For example, if the 
patent had soft government loans, the probability of a profitable commercialization decreases 
by 18 percent units. On the other hand, projects with more market-oriented government loans 
granted in the commercialization phase have the same performance as the average. By 
estimating separate effects for individual inventors and firms, the different risk level of the 
types of projects is taken into account. It turns out that the negative influence of government 
R&D-financing on the profit level is always significant for both firms and individual 
inventors.  
                                                 
15 Since the probit function is non-linear, the effect of a unit increase on the probability will vary depending on 
the point on the distribution. The effect is the largest in the middle of the distribution function, where vi is close 
to 0 and Pi(1) is close to 0.5.    
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  The fact that the estimations include projects with different kinds of government 
financing – soft and market-oriented financing terms – enables us to discriminate between 
two competing explanations for the government failure. The most important conclusion of the 
study is that the poor performance of projects financed by the government in the R&D-phase 
is caused by bad financing terms, rather than bad choices of projects. A policy implication is 
therefore that government institutions should make their financing and loans more market-
oriented already in the R&D-phase. 
One objection against the results would be that it is natural that public funded projects 
have a worse performance than those financed by private investors, since government has to 
choose among projects that are turned down by private investors. However, recent economic 
research has shown that this kind of soft government loans are more attractive for inventors 
and small firms than financing from private venture capitalists and business angels. Thus, it is 
not likely that government choose among inferior projects, which have been turned down by 
private investors. 
A non-commercialized patent may, of course, also be profitable for the owner, if it 
serves as a shadow patent – protecting other patents. But this is a strategy mainly used by 
large firms, which was also indicated by the descriptive statistics in section 3. Individuals and 
small firms can simply not afford such a costly strategy. 
  It would have been preferable to measure the outcome of the patent in money-terms, 
e.g., in US dollars. However, this is complicated, because most firms have many products in 
their statement of account, and many individuals do not have any statement of account at all. 
A suggestion for future research would be to ask the owners to estimate the market value of 
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Appendix: Soft loans provided by Swedish government authorities  
Among the Swedish government institutions, SIC (Foundation Innovation Centre) and 
NUTEK (Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth) offered loans with soft terms 
to inventors and high-tech small firms since the beginning of the 1990s until 2005. The loans 
were given during the R&D-phase. SIC and NUTEK had a yearly budget of ca. 6-8 MUSD. 
The loans for individual projects could range from 10,000 to 150,000 USD. 
To give soft loans to a firm or an inventor in the R&D-phase, the government 
authorities had three selection criteria: 1) the project should have a good chance of success 
both technically and commercially; 2) the project must be a high-tech project; and 3) the firm 
should not have more than 100 employees. A difference between the institutions was that 
SIC-loans were given to a higher degree to inventors and NUTEK-loans to firms. 
The government financing could cover up to 50-70 % of the total R&D-costs 
depending on which government authority provided the loan. Thus, there was a requirement 
of co-financing by the borrower or somebody else. However this co-financing was allowed to 
take the form of unpaid labor incomes. This is a cost which cannot be controlled by the 
government authority (moral hazard problems). Practically, the government loans could 
therefore cover more than 80 % of the project’s total R&D-costs. 
Three years after the loan was given, the borrower had to submit a report about the 
status of the project to the government authority. The repayment of the loan was connected to 
the turnover of the project and repayment possibly started after this report. If the project had 
failed, the loan was written off with a very high probability. If the project was based on a 
patent, then a requirement for write-off was that the patent was killed. There were some 
differences in the loan terms depending on whether the borrower had a firm or not when he or 
she signed the loan contract. 
 
1) The borrower had already a firm and incomes from other projects. The interest rate was 4 
% above the base rate of The Bank of Sweden. Interest was paid every third month, but not 
until the final report date (3 years after contract). Repayment was 5 % of turnover of the 
project, or 35 % of royalties in the case of licensing. 
 
2) The borrower had neither a firm nor incomes. The interest rate was 3.75 % above the 
interest rate of The Bank of Sweden. Interest was paid from the first date and capitalized in 
the end of each year. Repayment was 7 % of turnover of the project, or 35 % of royalties in 




Practically, the borrower only needed to repay 50 % of the loan if the borrower had 
some incomes from the project when the report was submitted. SIC was winded up in 2003 
and NUTEK in 2005, but similar loans have been offered by ALMI since 2003. The loan 
stocks of SIC and NUTEK were overtaken by ALMI. In 2005, ALMI evaluated the 
repayment of the loans offered by SIC and NUTEK. Only 13 % of the SIC loans and 33 % of 
the Nutek loans had been repaid. Thus, the default rates of the soft loans were as high as 87 
and 67 %, respectively.   
  Also in the Netherlands similar soft loans have been given by TOK (Technisch 
Ontwikkelingskrediet). TOK had a default rate of 43 % - considerably lower than in the 
Swedish case. The explanations are that the Dutch loans were also given to medium-sized 
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Table 1. Commercialization of patents across firm sizes, number of patents and percent. 
Number of patents 





Medium-sized firms (101-1000 employees)    77    39  116  66 % 
Small firms (11-100 employees)  137    64  201  68 % 
Close companies (2-10 employees)  105    37  142  74 % 
Inventors alone (1-4 inventors)  211  197  408  52 % 
Total 530  337  867  61  % 
 
 
Table 2. Outcome of the commercialization across firm groups, number of patents. 
Outcome  Kind of firm where the invention 
was created  Profit Break-even Loss  Uncertain 
 
Total 
Medium-sized firms    53  18     3    3    77 
Small firms    95  22    15    5  137 
Close companies    48  12    27  18  105 
Inventors alone    46  43    84  38  211 
Total  242 95 129 64 530 
 
 
Table 3. Commercialization performance across external financing, number of patents. 
Outcome  Commercialization mode 
Profit Break-even Loss  Uncertain 
Total 
Private venture capital R&D-phase    14    2     7    7   30 
Government soft loans R&D-phase    11    9    35  15   70 
Private venture capital 
commercialization phase 
       17           5         17          14         53 
Government market-oriented loans 
commercialization phase 
         9           5         19            8         41 
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Table 4. Commercialized patents and patents still alive 2004, number of patents and 
percent. 
Commercialized patents latest in 2003   
Patents  still alive 2004 




Yes 341  139  480  71  % 
No 189  198  387  49  % 
Total 530  337  867  61  % 
Percent still alive  64 %  41 %  55 %   




Table 5. Outcome of the commercialization across renewed and expired patents, number 
of patents. 
Commercialized patents 
Outcome   Renewed / expired patents 






1–3 years      5    5     9  0  19  33    52 
4–5 years    11    7    23  0  41  55    96 
6–7 years    33  17    29  0  79  58  137 
 
Expired patents, 
number of years 
after application 
> 7 years    24    6    20  0  50  52  102 
Subtotal of expired patents    73  35    81  0  189  198  387 
Patents renewed in 2004  169  60    48  64  341  139  480 
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Table 6. Explanatory variables and hypotheses. 
Hypotheses  Statistics (n=466)  Variable 
denotation 
 







Dummy which equals 1 if part of R&D financed by government, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy which equals 1 if part of R&D financed by private venture capital, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy which equals 1 if part of R&D financed by universities / research foundations, and 0 
otherwise 
Dummy which equals 1 if part of commercialization financed by government, and 0 otherwise 























Dummy which equals 1 for medium-sized firms (101-1000 employees), and 0 otherwise 
Dummy which equals 1 for small firms (11-100 employees), and 0 otherwise 













Dummy which equals 1 if the owners sold the patent, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy which equals 1 if the owners licensed the patent, and 0 otherwise 












Starting year of the commercialization 















Dummy which equals 1 if the inventors are active during the commercialization, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy which equals 1 if the product replaced a previous product for the owners 
Dummy which equals 1 if the owners have more substituting patents, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy which equals 1 if the product is a part of a larger system, and 0 otherwise 
Number of inventors 
Dummy which equals 1 if complementing patents are need to create a product, and 0 otherwise 
Share of inventors, who are females 
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Table 7. Empirical estimations of the ordered probit model. 
Dependent variable: PROFIT     Statistical model:  
Ordered probit model 
without sample selection 
Ordered probit model 
with sample selection 
Model  Explanatory variables 










   -0.62 *** 
   (0.20) 
    0.29 
   (0.33) 
    0.24 
   (0.42) 
    0.055 
   (0.25) 
   -0.021 
   (0.27) 
   -0.60 *** 
   (0.20) 
    0.26 
   (0.33) 
    0.19 
   (0.45) 
   -0.015 
   (0.25) 
   -8.9 E-3 
   (0.27) 
   -0.59 *** 
   (0.20) 
    0.38 
   (0.34) 
    0.16 
   (0.45) 
    0.040 
   (0.26) 
   -3.8 E-3 
   (0.28) 
   -0.63 *** 
   (0.19) 
    0.29 
   (0.29) 
   -0.090 
   (0.43) 
    0.040 
   (0.21) 
   -0.023 
   (0.23) 
   -0.56 *** 
   (0.18) 
    0.25 
   (0.28) 
   -0.28 
   (0.41) 
   -0.034 
   (0.19) 
    0.014 
   (0.21) 
   -0.58 *** 
   (0.19) 
    0.33 
   (0.29) 
   -0.27 
   (0.45) 
   -7.5 E-3 
   (0.21) 
    0.012 






    1.25 *** 
   (0.24) 
    0.91 *** 
   (0.19) 
    0.50 *** 
   (0.18) 
    1.28 *** 
   (0.25) 
    0.94 *** 
   (0.19) 
    0.60 *** 
   (0.18) 
    1.33 *** 
   (0.26) 
    0.93 *** 
   (0.20) 
    0.58 *** 
   (0.18) 
    1.12 *** 
   (0.27) 
    0.89 *** 
   (0.19) 
    0.62 *** 
   (0.16) 
    1.05 *** 
   (0.23) 
    0.84 *** 
   (0.17) 
    0.68 *** 
   (0.16) 
    1.10 *** 
   (0.26) 
    0.83 *** 
   (0.19) 
    0.68 *** 






    0.71 ** 
   (0.32) 
    0.49 ** 
   (0.23)  
   -0.33 
   (0.23) 
    0.76 ** 
   (0.33) 
    0.53 ** 
   (0.23)  
   -0.31 
   (0.24) 
    0.74 ** 
   (0.34) 
    0.51 ** 
   (0.24)  
   -0.35 
   (0.24) 
    0.54 ** 
   (0.27) 
    0.38 * 
   (0.20)  
   -0.29 
   (0.19) 
    0.52 ** 
   (0.25) 
    0.34 ** 
   (0.17)  
   -0.27 
   (0.18) 
    0.53 ** 
   (0.27) 
    0.35 * 
   (0.19)  
   -0.30 





   -0.018 
   (0.035) 
   -0.037 
   (0.048) 
   -0.013 
   (0.036) 
   -0.049 
   (0.049) 
   -0.017 
   (0.036) 
   -0.042 
   (0.049) 
   -0.025 
   (0.030) 
   -0.016 
   (0.044) 
   -0.022 
   (0.029) 
   -0.019 
   (0.040) 
   -0.026 
   (0.031) 
   -0.015 

















    0.68 *** 
   (0.19) 
    0.55 ** 
   (0.26) 
    0.30 ** 
   (0.12) 
    0.19 
   (0.22) 
   -0.081 
   (0.10) 
  0.040 
 (0.16) 
  0.061 
 (0.44) 
  0.028 
 (0.42) 
    0.77 *** 
   (0.19) 
    0.43 * 
   (0.26) 
    0.28 ** 
   (0.12) 
    0.17 
   (0.23) 
   -0.055 
   (0.11) 
  0.044 
 (0.16) 
  0.027 
 (0.44) 
  0.15 
 (0.43) 
    0.71 *** 
   (0.19) 
    0.48 * 
   (0.27) 
    0.31 ** 
   (0.13) 
    0.14 
   (0.23) 
   -0.059 
   (0.11) 
  0.046 
 (0.16) 
  0.083 
 (0.45) 
  0.12 
 (0.43) 
    0.53 *** 
   (0.19) 
    0.40 * 
   (0.22) 
    0.31 *** 
   (0.12) 
    0.15 
   (0.20) 
   -0.11 
   (0.089) 
  0.25 
 (0.16) 




    0.52 *** 
   (0.16) 
    0.24 
   (0.18) 
    0.27 ** 
   (0.11) 
    0.13 
   (0.18) 
   -0.085 
   (0.090) 
  0.28 
 (0.14) 
  0.20 
 (0.35) 
  0.095 
 (0.39) 
    0.51 *** 
   (0.18) 
    0.30 
   (0.19) 
    0.31 *** 
   (0.12) 
    0.13 
   (0.20) 
   -0.087 
   (0.094) 
  0.27 
 (0.15) 
  0.20 
 (0.37) 
  0.079 
 (0.41) 
Intercept 
Ω (threshold value) 
ρ (correlation between residuals) 
   36.22 
     0.70 
   24.52 
     0.70 
   33.79 
     0.71 
   49.46 
     0.54 
     0.80 *** 
   43.11 
     0.48 
     0.92 *** 


















Likelihood ratio test 
 -904.40 
   
 -901.51 
   
 -893.61 
   
 -903.77 
     1.24 
 -899.95 
    3.12 * 
 -892.44 
     2.35 
Note: The number of observations equals 466. However, 803 observations is included in the Probit equation. The dependent 
variable PROFIT takes on the values of 2, 1 and 0 for 242, 95 and 129 observations, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parentheses and ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Dummy variables as well as 
estimates from the first step of the Heckman-procedure are not shown, but are available from the author upon request. 
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Table 8. Separate effects of government financing for individuals and firms. 
Dependent variable: PROFIT                            Statistical model: Ordered probit model 
Model  Explanatory variables 











  -0.46 ** 
  (0.22) 
  -1.10 *** 
  (0.39) 
   0.64 
  (0.44) 
  -0.47 ** 
  (0.22) 
  -1.02 ** 
  (0.40) 
   0.56 
  (0.45) 
   -0.45 ** 
   (0.23)    
   -1.03 ** 
   (0.41) 
    0.58 
   (0.46) 
   -0.51 ** 
   (0.23)    
   -1.01 *** 
   (0.33) 
    0.50 
   (0.36) 
   -0.47 ** 
   (0.19)    
   -0.86 *** 
   (0.32) 
    0.39 
   (0.34) 
   -0.48 ** 
   (0.21)    
   -0.91 ** 
   (0.34) 
    0.44 








Table 9. Marginal effects of explanatory variables. Ordered probit, Models C and F. 
Marginal effect on probabilities when dummy variables increase from 0 to 1. 
Model C  Model F 
 
Dummy variables 












-0.37    
  0.22 
  0.19 
















  0.44 
  0.34 





  0.01 
  0.00 
  0.42 
  0.31 






  0.12 
-0.11 
-0.07 
  0.02 
  0.27 




  0.12 
-0.00 
  0.01 
-0.02 
  0.20 























Note: All marginal effects are calculated around the means of the x:s. Similar marginal effects were obtained for 
Models A, B, D and E, which are available from the author on request. 
 